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In “Epiphenomenal Qualia” Frank Jackson argues against Physicalism (the thesis that all correct 
information is physical information) and for the existence of qualia on the grounds that all of the physical 
information possible cannot explain the qualitative feel of experience (qualia). In “The Knowledge 
Argument for Qualia” Jackson partakes in a thought experiment using the examples of “Fred” and 
“Mary” to show that having all of the physical information about color; including all of the information 
about physical history, physiology, behavior, light waves, and the physical sciences fails to provide the 
information of what it is like for Fred and Mary to experience (see) color. Given that all of the physical 
information cannot provide all of the information available, Jackson concludes that Physicalism is false 
and that qualia exist, for some information is not physical. I argue against Jackson on the grounds that he 
assumes that physical information must be publicly accessible and that the experience of color (privately 
accessible information) cannot be physical information. Moreover, I argue that all information is 
contextually dependent upon one’s physical environment and physiological functions, thus it is possible 







In “Epiphenomenal Qualia” Frank Jackson argues with the Knowledge Argument (KA) 
against Physicalism on the grounds that it fails to provide all of the information necessary 
to explain the qualitative aspects of consciousness and experience. Instead of 
consciousness being explained by physical information, Jackson proposes that 
consciousness is characterized by qualia which he defines as “certain features of the 
bodily sensations, but also of certain perceptual experiences, which no amount of purely 
physical information includes” (24). Jackson holds Physicalism to be the “thesis that all 
(correct) information is physical information” which fails to explain qualia because 
information about qualia cannot be discovered through the discovery of physical 
information (24). That is, physical information, which includes the “physical, chemical, 
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and biological sciences” in addition to the “functions” one can infer from observing the 
relations of physical objects, cannot explain nor discover what it is like to experience the 
color red or the feeling of pain (24). Thus, according to Jackson, qualia are not 
explainable by physical information and Physicalism is false given that Physicalism fails 
to provide all of the information with physical information (25-26). In the first section of 
the paper I will present Jackson’s Knowledge Argument. Then, I will argue against (KA) 
on the grounds that Jackson’s notion of physical information is perhaps too narrow and 
that it is possible for conscious experience to be a different kind of physical information.  
 
 
I.  Jackson’s “Knowledge Argument for Qualia” 
 
Jackson attempts to refute Physicalism and argue for qualia with his advancement of the 
“Knowledge Argument for Qualia” (KA) which he sets forth using the examples of Fred 
and Mary (24-26). Fred is an individual who has the best “color vision” ever recorded, 
with an unparalleled ability to “discriminate” between colors, and additionally, he can 
make a discrimination of color we are not capable of making (24). When given a “batch 
of ripe tomatoes” Fred consistently sorts the tomatoes into two “equal” groups, even after 
Fred has been “blind folded” and the tomatoes have been mixed up (24). Upon the 
blindfolds removal Fred can still sort the tomatoes into the same groups (24). Fred is 
asked how he sorts the tomatoes and replies that the ripe tomatoes are not all the same 
color to him, nor are other objects “we classify together as red” (24). While other people 
see only one red color, Fred sees two distinct colors which he calls “red1” and “red2” to 
avoid confusion with the other people who can see only red (24). That is, Fred sees “red1” 
and “red2” as distinctly as we distinguish red from blue, but we only experience the single 
color “red” whereas Fred experiences red as two colors. 
 
Thus, we can observe Fred’s uncanny ability to discriminate between the tomatoes but 
we do not know what it is like to see red as two distinct colors (the way Fred sees red as 
two colors instead of one). Moreover, Jackson emphasizes that upon examining Fred 
physiologically (his “optical system”) it is observed that he “is able to separate out two 
groups of wavelengths in the red spectrum as sharply as we are able to sort out yellow 
from blue” (25). Jackson continues to describe Fred’s physical information pointing out 
that we “could find out perhaps that Fred’s cones respond differentially to certain light 
waves in the red section of the spectrum” or maybe he has “an extra cone which leads to 
a wider range of brain states responsible for visual discriminatory behavior” (25). Thus, 
Jackson emphasizes, we can have all of Fred’s physical information including everything 
about his physiology, history, “behavior and dispositions” and still not have all of the 
information about Fred, because we lack the knowledge of what it is like to see red the 
way Fred sees it (25).  
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Moreover, if when Fred dies and his “optical system” is transplanted “into someone 
else”, that person may now be capable of experiencing red as Fred did, however as 
Jackson reiterates, it still follows that all of the physical information failed to provide 
everything there was to know about Fred’s color vision (25). That is, after Fred’s optical 
system is transplanted into someone else, that person may gain Fred’s experience of red, 
thus, more knowledge will be known about Fred. However, all of Fred’s physical 
information had been attained before the transplant, and it did not give us knowledge of 
what it was like for Fred to experience red (25). Given that all physical information about 
Fred fails to provide everything there is to know about Fred (his experience of red as red1 
and red2), and moreover, since no amount of physical information would allow one to see 
red as Fred does, Jackson concludes that, “Physicalism is incomplete” (25). 
 
Jackson similarly uses “Mary” in his second formulation of (KA) to argue for the 
incompleteness of physical information in providing everything there is to know. Jackson 
describes Mary as “a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to investigate 
the world from a black and white room via a black and white television monitor” (25). 
Thus, Mary has never actually seen (experienced) any other color except for black and 
white (as Jackson implicitly implies). Additionally, Mary has “all” of “the physical 
information there is to obtain about what goes on when we see ripe tomatoes, or the sky, 
and use terms like ‘red’, ‘blue’, and so on” (25). As it were, Mary has all of the physical 
information about seeing and explaining the experience of color. Jackson further 
emphasizes the extent of Mary’s knowledge about physical information regarding color 
in terms of physiological functions: 
 
“She discovers, for example, just which wavelength combinations from the sky 
stimulate the retina, and exactly how this produces via the central nervous system 
the contraction of the vocal chords and expulsion of air from the lungs that results 
in the uttering of the sentence ‘The sky is blue’” (25).  
 
As it were, Mary has all of the physical information about color, its interaction with the 
body and in turn how the body affects behavior. Jackson explains that it is theoretically 
possible for Mary to have obtained all of her “physical information from a black and 
white television” or else “Open University would of necessity need to use colour 
television” (25). Thus, Jackson implies that it is possible to obtain all of the physical 
information about colors, despite not having seen colors. 
 
After presenting the extent of Mary’s possession of physical information, Jackson poses 
the question of whether or not Mary will “learn anything” when she leaves her “black 
and white room” or receives a “colour television monitor” (25). Jackson claims it to be 
obvious that she will learn something new, thus, “her previous knowledge was 
incomplete” (25). Accordingly, the knowledge Mary gains after seeing color cannot be of 
physical information, thus, it is also knowledge which cannot be gained by possessing all 
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of the physical information (25). That is, if Mary had all of the physical information 
about color before seeing color, and then learns new information (what it is like to see 
color), then “Physicalism is false” because it fails to prove that all information is physical 
information, since some information is not physical (25-26). The knowledge of 
nonphysical information that Mary gains upon experiencing color is the knowledge of 
qualia (i.e. the feel of the sensation of color). Jackson emphasizes that (KA) could be 
utilized to include (qualia) such as, “taste, hearing, the bodily sensations and generally 
speaking for the various mental states which are said to have (as it is variously put) raw 
feels, phenomenal features or qualia” (26). Jackson concludes (KA) by reiterating that the 
Physicalist fails to account for qualia, and that it is difficult to “deny” (KA)’s “central 
claim that one can have all of physical information without having all of the information 
there is to have” (26). 
 
 
II. Jackson’s Assumptions 
 
What are Jackson’s assumptions in his presentation of Fred and Mary? Jackson’s first 
assumption is in how he defines physical information. Jackson points out that we can 
have all of the physical information about Fred including all of the information about his 
physical history, his behavior, including his observable ability to discriminate between 
colors, in addition to all of the information about his physiology such as his brain and 
optical system (25). Mary also has all of the “physical information” about color including 
how light waves interact with the central nervous system, optical system, and 
physiologically influence behavior (25). On the basis of Jackson’s use of physical 
information, we can infer that physical information for Jackson means information which 
is publicly accessible. That is, information which is physically observable or can be 
learned about a physical process including through scientific investigation (23-24). 
 
Jackson’s assumption that physical information is information which is publicly 
accessible can be shown with reference to Mary having all of the physical information 
about color, however lacking the knowledge of what it is like to see color. Thus, Mary 
can have all of the (publicly accessible) “physical information” about color and lack 
knowledge of the experience of seeing color (25). On this basis, Jackson concludes that 
when Mary leaves her black and white room she will gain knowledge that her possession 
of all of the (publicly accessible) physical information could not provide; the knowledge 
of what it is like to experience color (25-26). Accordingly, Jackson takes “qualia”, that is, 
Fred’s experience of red1 and red2, and Mary’s gained knowledge of color to be privately 
accessible information. Thus, all of the publicly accessible “physical information” failed 
to provide knowledge of the privately accessible information of what it was like for Fred 
to experience red, and for Mary to experience color. 
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What do I mean that by “qualia” Jackson means privately accessible information? It was 
observed that Mary could have all of the physical information about color, and we could 
have all of the physical information about Fred. However, all of the publicly accessible 
“physical information” including all of the information about behavior, physiology, light 
waves, and history failed to provide information about the personal experience of what it 
is like for Fred to experience red, and for Mary to experience color (25). Thus, only Fred 
had direct immediate access to his privately accessible information of his experience of 
red1 and red2 and could not explain his experience to others, while others had all of the 
publicly accessible information about Fred and could not access what it was like for Fred 
to experience red (24-25). As it were, the ‘feeling of being happy’ and ‘what it is like to 
see red’ are kinds of privately accessible information which only the individual having 
the experience, experiences immediately and directly as their own experience. Others can 
at best observe that I physically appear to be happy, or observe that I have physiological 
changes in my brain correlated with happiness, but they lack my experience of happiness 
as only I can experience it. 
 
Given that Jackson restricts “physical information” to be information which is publicly 
accessible, and knowledge of qualia to be information which is only privately accessible; 
Jackson is led to the conclusion that Physicalism is false since all of the “physical 
information” (publicly accessible information) fails to provide all of the information 
available, thus, lacking information about “qualia” (privately accessible information) 
(26). Accordingly, Jackson assumes that all “physical information” must be publicly 
accessible information, and that private information cannot be physical information since 
private information is not publicly accessible. Thus, since “physical information” must be 
publicly accessible information, and that information of “qualia” (what it is like to have 
an experience) is only privately and not publicly accessible; Jackson concludes that 
physical information is not all of the information available, and that qualia exist because 
private information cannot be discovered with physical information (publicly accessible 
information). As it were, Jackson’s use of the term “physical information” to describe 
publicly accessible information leads him to ignore the possibility that private and public 
information could both be different kinds of physical information. 
 
 
III. The Possibility of Conscious Experience being a Kind of Physical Information 
 
The problem with Jackson’s assumption that physical information must be publicly 
accessible is that he assumes that since “qualia” are not publicly accessible, that qualia 
are a non-physical kind of information. Indeed, it may be the case that all of the publicly 
accessible “physical information” about the “living brain, the kind of states, their 
functional roles” and “their relation to what goes on at other times and in other brains” 
may not be capable of explaining what it is like to experience “the hurtfulness of pains, 
the itchiness of itches, pangs of jealousy” or what it is like to “smell”, ”taste”, “see”, or 
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“hear” (24). However, it is observed that when Fred’s “optical system” is transplanted 
into someone else, the knowledge that person gains of Fred’s experience of an “extra 
colour” is a result of physically receiving Fred’s optical system (25). Moreover, before 
Mary experienced color she was confined to a physical environment that was only black 
and white. It is only after Mary is introduced a new physical environment which allows 
Mary to experience color that Mary can experience colors (25). Thus, the privately 
accessible knowledge Mary gains by seeing color (what Jackson thinks is “qualia”) is a 
result of her interaction with a physical environment. Accordingly, it is possible for 
Mary’s experience of color to be a kind of physical information, for without interacting 
with a new physical environment, Mary would not have experienced what it is like to see 
color at all.  
 
What do I mean when I say that by feeling happy or seeing the color red I am 
experiencing a kind of physical information? After all, Mary had all of the publicly 
accessible “physical information” about color and still did not know what it was like to 
see color. It is true that Mary knew all of the physical information about how the optical 
system perceives light waves, and the ways in which the light waves affect the body’s 
physiological processes, the brain, and behavior (25). However, Mary’s knowledge of 
“physical information” is dependent upon her physical environment in the same manner 
that her knowledge of color is. If it were the case that Mary had always been blind and 
deaf, Mary would lack the knowledge of what it was like to experience color and sound. 
Similarly, Mary would be incapable of knowing all of the “physical” information about 
colors and the body’s physiological functions, for she would have no way of learning this 
information. Moreover, a colorblind person may fail to see red and green due to 
limitations of their optic system, as such, their experience is limited to the capacity of 
their physiological functions. Thus, public and privately accessible information is 
contextually dependent and limited upon the features of one’s physical environment in 
correspondence to the limitations of one’s physiological functions. 
 
What I hope to have established is that it is possible that all information is in a sense 
physical information, for one cannot have information at all without there first being a 
kind of physical information within the context of a physical environment. When I say 
kind of physical information I do not mean that feeling happy or seeing red resembles 
some physical feature in the environment nor that you will find ‘happy’ or ‘red’ by 
examining someone’s brain. No, I mean that the knowledge of the experience of feeling 
happy or seeing red is based upon (1): one’s physiological functions and (2): one’s 
physiological functions in interaction with the physical environment. Thus, I gain 
knowledge of the experience of red only under the conditions (1): that my optical system 
and brain allows me to experience red, and (2): there must be (at least once) something 
physical in the environment that interacts with (1) in such a way to allow for the 
experience of ‘red’. 
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Jackson could object to this because I am still not explaining what it is like to experience 
‘red’ or ‘happy’. This is true, it may be the case that it is not possible to explain the 
qualitative feel of experience in terms of a physical process in the body, or that all of the 
publicly accessible information about color and feeling happy cannot tell us what it is like 
to experience color or happiness. However, it does not follow that since ‘seeing red’ or 
‘feeling jealous’ cannot currently be physically explained and reduced to physical terms 
(i.e. a physical process) that experience itself is not a kind of physical information. Thus, 
it may just be the case that our conscious experience is a kind of physical information, 
which just happens to be currently undiscoverable through empirical observation and the 
physical sciences; however, it could be discovered in the future. Thus, the experience of 
consciousness is currently only observable by the person undergoing the experience, but 
the experience itself is physical information resulting from a physical and physically 





While Jackson argues in (KA) that Physicalism is false given that all of the physical 
information failed to provide knowledge of what it is like for Fred to experience red and 
for Mary to experience color (25-26). (KA) fails in that it already assumes the existence 
of qualia, and thus, Physicalism to be false. That is to say, Jackson believes that there are 
features of experience like ‘feeling happy’ or ‘seeing red’ (qualia) which cannot be 
discovered with all of the “physical information” about the physiological processes of the 
brain, the nervous system, ties to behavior and the physical happenings in the world (23-
26). As it were, when Mary leaves her black and white room and (most likely) first 
experiences color; Jackson takes it to be the case that Mary is gaining knowledge of the 
experience of color (qualia) which her possession of all of the physical information could 
not provide (25). Thus, Mary’s previous knowledge of all of the physical information was 
“incomplete” and Physicalism is false. 
 
However, I argued that Jackson mistakenly assumes that physical information can only be 
publicly accessible information, and since information of conscious experience is only 
privately accessible. Jackson assumes that information of conscious experience cannot be 
physical information. Thus, Jackson fails to see that the qualities of conscious experience 
have the possibility of being a kind of physical information. Moreover, I argued that it is 
only because of the capacity of Mary’s physiological functions and their interaction with 
the physical environment that Mary can gain Knowledge at all. Thus, Mary can gain the 
knowledge of what it is like to see color, if and only if Mary (1): has the physiological 
capability of seeing color and (2): interacts with an environment which physically allows 
her to see color. Thus, when Mary gains knowledge of the experience of color, it is 
possible that Mary is actually experiencing a kind of physical information. As it were, 
Mary’s knowledge before experiencing color would have been previously limited by not 
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having all of the kinds of physical information. Accordingly, it is possible that all 
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